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November 2007, News From USW: A survey done by the United
Steelworkers (USW) union reveals that the conditions that led to the March
2005 explosion at BP's Texas City refinery are widespread throughout the
refining sector and that the industry is failing to learn from such explosions
and near-misses.
Titled "Beyond Texas City: The State of Process Safety in the
Unionized U.S. Oil Refining Industry," the union's report is based on the
results of a 64-item survey sent to local unions at 71 USW-represented
refineries nine months following the Texas City explosion. Findings were also
based on a review of the literature on regulations, guidelines and lessons
learned from previous refinery disasters.
The response rate to the survey was 72%. The 51 sites that responded
represented 49 percent of the U.S. refining capacity and 22 refining companies,
including majors and independents.
The survey was based on four contributing factors to the March 2000
explosion: use of atmospheric vents on process units, failed management of
instrumentation and alarm systems, placement of trailers and unprotected
buildings near high risk process facilities, and allowance of non-essential
personnel in high risk areas during start-up and shutdown.
Workers at 90 percent of the 51 refineries said their
facilities had at least one of the conditions (use of atmospheric vents,
placement of trailers and allowance of non-essential personnel). Sixty-one
percent of the respondents, representing 31 refineries, reported at least one
incident or near miss involving at least one of the four contributing factors
in the past three years.
Many of the refineries that had at least one of the four
conditions reported after the BP (Nachrichten/Aktienkurs) explosion either
did not take action or took actions judged as less than very effective. A
review of past refinery disasters also revealed similar hazardous conditions
being repeated and not learned from.
"These findings indicate that the potential exists in the
refining sector for another Texas City style explosion," said USW
International President Leo W. Gerard. "Apparently, that incident did not
make enough of an impression on refiners because they continue to not heed
the lessons learned from the explosions, fires and other incidents plaguing
the industry."
The survey shows refiners are not following the letter and
spirit of OSHA's process safety standard. When 16 process safety systems for
start-ups or shutdowns were rated, 87 percent of the respondents said the
overall management of process safety systems at their sites was less than
very effective.
Other shortfalls revealed were inadequate staffing, lack of
safety preparedness for contract workers to enable them to contribute to
incident prevention, insufficient refinery preparation for handling hazardous
materials emergencies and lack of emergency response training for the general
plant population.
"It is time for the oil industry to step up to the plate and
promptly address these deficiencies in process safety," said USW
International Vice President Gary Beevers. "The oil companies can afford to
do this and have a moral obligation to do so. A disaster like the explosion
in Texas City is totally preventable."
The USW calls on the refining sector to enact various process
safety measures and involve workers and their union representatives in their
implementation. These measures call on the industry to establish process
safety teams, ensure process hazard analyses are done, eliminate atmospheric
vents, manage instrumentation and alarms, create a definition of "safe
placement," ensure nonessential personnel are outside of hazardous areas,
provide effective and participatory training and drills, ensure all operating
manuals and procedures are in order, review and update management of change
procedures, put into place an effective incident and near miss investigation
program, and develop and put into action a national set of standardized
process safety metrics.
Government intervention is also called for in strengthening
OSHA and EPA standards and ensuring their rigorous enforcement. Changes in
regulation are needed, such as the counting of contractor injuries and
illnesses in oil companies' OSHA logs. More OSHA inspectors are needed and
should be given extra time to handle process safety inspections because they
are complicated and time consuming.
"These proposals are doable, and while they can't bring back
the 15 workers killed at the BP Texas City refinery, they can make it harder
for future deaths and injuries to occur," Gerard said.
The USW is the largest industrial union in North America and
represents over 1.2 million workers and retirees. In the oil sector, the
union represents 30,000 workers. A copy of the report can be obtained at
www.beyondtexascity.org.
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