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Introduction Background
Incident Description
Lessons Learned
Management of Process Safety
Safety Equipment

CSB Safety Bulletins offer advisory information on good practices for managing chemical process hazards. Actual CSB case histories provide supporting information. Safety Bulletins differ from CSB Investigation Reports in that they do not comprehensively review all the causes of an incident.


U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
Office of Investigations and Safety Programs
2175 K Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20037
202-261-7600
http://www.chemsafety.gov




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Lessons Learned  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Chemical processing enterprises should establish policies to manage deviations from normal operations. Systematic methods for managing change are sometimes applied to physical alterations, such as those that occur when an interlock is bypassed, new equipment is added, or a replacement is “not in kind.” However, the Equilon incident underscores the need to have MOC policies that include abnormal situations, changes to procedures, and deviations from standard operating conditions.

For an MOC system to function effectively, field personnel need to know how to recognize which deviations are significant enough to trigger further review. It is essential to prepare operating procedures with well-defined limits for process variables for all common tasks. Once onsite personnel are trained on MOC policy and are knowledgeable about normal limits for process variables, they can make informed judgments regarding when to apply the MOC system.

Once a deviation is identified that triggers the MOC system, it is management’s responsibility to gather the right people and resources to review the situation. The skills of a multidisciplinary team may be required to thoroughly identify potential hazards, develop protective measures, and propose a course of action.

The Equilon incident could have been avoided if the “change” was managed by a team experienced in hands-on operations, safety procedures, and engineering calculations. Written procedures for cooling and emptying partially filled drums, as recommended by an Equilon investigation team in 1996, might also have reduced the likelihood of this incident.

The incident underscores the need to have MOC policies that include abnormal situations, changes to procedures, and deviations from standard operating conditions.

 

 

The incident could have been avoided if the “change” was managed by a team experienced in hands-on operations, safety procedures, and engineering calculations.

 

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