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Introduction Background
Incident Description
Lessons Learned
Management of Process Safety
Safety Equipment

CSB Safety Bulletins offer advisory information on good practices for managing chemical process hazards. Actual CSB case histories provide supporting information. Safety Bulletins differ from CSB Investigation Reports in that they do not comprehensively review all the causes of an incident.


U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
Office of Investigations and Safety Programs
2175 K Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20037
202-261-7600
http://www.chemsafety.gov




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Management of Chemical Process Safety  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Center for Chemical Process Safety, an industry-sponsored organization affiliated with the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, offers this useful guidance in its publication, Guidelines for Technical Management of Chemical Process Safety (1989):

In any operation, situations will arise that were not foreseen when the operating procedures were developed. At such times, personnel may want to conduct operations in a way that differs from, or contradicts, the process technology or the standard operating procedures.

To assure that these deviations from normal practice do not create unacceptable risks, it is important to have a variance procedure, or to have incorporated the same means of control into other management systems. The variance procedure will require review of the planned deviation, and acceptance of the risks it poses. The variance procedure should require

  • the explanation of the deviation planned;
  • the reasons it is necessary;
  • the safety, health, and environmental considerations;
  • control measures to be taken;
  • and duration of the variance.

Variances should require the approval by a suitable level of management, based on the process risks involved. Also, they should be documented to assure consistent understanding by all affected individuals and departments of what specific departure from normal practice is to be allowed.

A formal hazard analysis may be appropriate depending on the complexity of the change or variance. A hazard analysis for the Equilon situation would have likely determined the limitations of the temperature readings and that it was unsafe to open the drum. It would have also identified the possible release of a large volume of very hot liquid as a significant risk

"To assure that deviations from normal practice do not create unacceptable risks, it is important to have a variance procedure, or to have incorporated the same means of control into other management systems.”

 

 

 

 
   

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